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Summarv:
t
A systematic, comprehensive methodology for the design and evaluation
of internal accounting control systems in an environment of multiple con-
flicting objectives and complex system interrelationships is presented.
The multiple objective decision making (MODM) technique of goal programming
is used to model relationships among exposures, causes of exposures and
controls. This technique is especially appropriate in decision-making
situations in which there exist conflicting objectives concerning costs
and effectiveness of alternative internal control configurations. An
example system is used to demonstrate the modeling capabilities and interpre-
tation possible with the developed methodology. The role of sensitivity
analysis in model implementation is also discussed.
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I. Statement of the Problem
Introduction to Problem Area
In recent years, several developments have led to increased interest
by both management and auditors in the design and evaluation of internal
accounting control systems. The growing use of computer-based informa-
tion systems has increased the decision-making burden on both groups.
The independent Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities has recommended
a management report on the financial statements that presents "management's
assessment of the company's accounting system and controls over It."
The SEC has recently issued a proposal that, if adopted, will require
outside auditors to review and test clients' internal controls, along
with management comment on the adequacy of such controls in annual re-
ports and 10-K forms. Also, ASR no. 242 states that public companies
should review their "accounting procedures, systems of internal account-
ing controls and business practices" in order to take actions necessary
to comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. The Accounting
Standards section of the Act requires public companies to
...devise and maintain a system of internal accounting .
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that -
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with manage-
ment's general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit
preparation of financial statements in conformity with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria
applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain account-
ability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with
the existing assets at reasonable intervals and„appropriate
action is taken with respect to any difference.
The broad objectives of the Accounting Standards section were taken
verbatim from the professional auditing literature. These objectives
were originally developed to provide guidance on the independent auditor's
study and evaluation of internal control, which serves as a basis for
setting the scope of the examination of financial statements. Although
auditors test only those controls on which they intend to rely, managements
are concerned with the entire system of controls, and need to delineate
objectives in more specific terms to guide the selection of controls to
be implemented.
The statement that controls should provide "reasonable" assurance
that control objectives are met implies that managements are free to
take prudent business risks deemed necessary to achieve corporate objec-
tives and that the costs of implemented controls should not exceed the
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expected benefits. Among the costs considered in the literature are
out-of-pocket costs of installing control features, performing control
procedures, searching for errors when their existence has been signaled
and making necessary corrections.
The primary benefit of an individual control or group of controls
is the reduction of one or more exposures (expected dollar losses due
to errors or irregularities which cause them) . Types of exposures in-
clude unintentional loss of physical assets, money, claims to money and
other assets; business expenses which could be readily avoided and loss
of revenues to which the organization is entitled; penalties which must
be paid as a result of judicial or regulatory proceedings; and inten-
tional misappropriation of funds. The purpose of controls is to reduce
exposures by preventing or detecting and correcting the errors or irreg-
4
ularities which cause them.
Complicating Factors
The process of selecting which controls to implement is complicated
by two factors. The first is that each control has at least two important,
incommensurable attributes: (1) costs, out-of-pocket installation and
operating and (2) effectiveness (defined as the probability that the
target cause of exposure will not occur or will be detected and corrected,
depending on the control during a specified period of time). Managerial
objectives with respect to these attributes inherently conflict.
Management presumably wishes to minimize the total out-of-pocket costs
of the control system or a particular subsystem while maximizing its
effectiveness, subject to constraints dictated by environment or re-
sources. However, the least expensive controls or control combinations
may also be the least effective..
The second complicating factor is that system interrelationships may
be extremely complex. Three situations can exist: (1) alternative controls
or groups of controls may affect (prevent or detect and correct) a partic-
ular cause of exposure, (2) individual controls may affect more than one
cause and (3) individual causes may generate more than one exposure.
(See Table 1) . The complexity resulting from these two factors necessi-
tates a systematic, approach to internal accounting control system design
and evaluation.
Previous Research Efforts
A search of the professional and academic accounting literature
reveals that a satisfactory approach has not been developed at this time.
A recent publication by the Institute of Internal Auditors recommends
that the decision-maker "analyze" the various controls that would affect
causes of a particular exposure and then implement "only those which are
sufficient to effectively limit the exposure." Arthur Andersen & Co.
recommends that "judgment" be used to select controls which will prevent
g
causes of exposures if those exposures are judged to be material. In
1974, Cushing stated that the closest approach to an analytical technique
in actual design and evaluation of internal control systems may be the
Q
auditor's widely used internal control questionnaire. This belief is
reinforced by the AICPA Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting
Control, which recently concluded that control procedures and techniques
have evolved over the years based on the judgments of individual manage-
ments of their necessity or usefulness in specific situations.
Only recently have accounting researchers begun to apply mathematical
modeling techniques to the problem of internal control system design and
evaluation. Cushing applied reliability theory to the design problem;
Yu and Neter used Markov theory to assess the reliability of a system of
12
controls; and Burns and Loebbecke demonstrated the use of simulation
13in internal control evaluation by external auditors. ~ These research
efforts demonstrate the usefulness of different mathematical modeling
techniques in attacking various aspects of the problem. However, because
of their particular purposes, the resulting models do not incorporate the
conflicting and incommensurable managerial objectives of minimizing out-
of-pocket costs and maximizing effectiveness. Furthermore, they are not
designed to reflect the complex interrelationships among exposures, causes
and controls that characterize real-world situations. Not surprisingly,
the Special Advisory Committee on Internal Accounting Control recently
stated that "companies do not have a comprehensive theoretical model to use
in making informed, supportable judgments on the cost-benefit decisions
14
implicit in developing their accounting control procedures and techniques.'
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate the use of a
systematic, comprehensive methodology in the design and evaluation of
internal accounting control systems in an environment of multiple con-
flicting objectives and complex system interrelationships. For reasons
forthcoming, the multiple objective decision making (MODM) technique of
goal programming will be used to model relationships among exposures,
causes of exposures and controls. This technique is especially appro-
priate in decision-making situations in which there exist conflicting
objectives concerning costs and effectiveness of alternative internal
control configurations. The role of sensitivity analysis in model
implementation will also be discussed.
It is anticipated that the methodology will provide management with
not only the analytical benefits of a systematic approach to internal con-
trol system design and evaluation, but also increasingly important docu-
mentation that such an analysis has been made. Also, the methodology can
provide independent auditors with an opportunity to improve their assess-
ment of an internal control system for use in (a) setting the scope of
the examination of financial statements and (b) reviewing management
comment on the adequacy of the control system.
II. Methodological Approaches to Multiple Objective Problems
Taxonomy of Methods
The purpose of MODM methods is to consider the various interactions
within the design constraints and select the best alternative configur-
ation of decision variables which satisfies the decision-maker (DM) by
attaining acceptable levels of a set of quantifiable objectives. •
Hwang and Masud classify MODM methods which require DM preference infor-
mation as a priori, interactive or a posteriori, depending on the stage
of the solution procedure at which such information is required.
(See Figure 1.)
A priori methods require the DM to provide preference information
to the analyst before he actually solves the problem. The information
may be either cardinal or mixed (cardinal and ordinal) . In the case of
cardinal information, the DM must state specific preference levels or
trade-offs. If the information is mixed, the DM must also rank the
objectives in order of their importance.
Interactive methods rely on the progressive articulation of the
DM's preferences during exploration of the criterion space. These
methods assume that the DM is unable to indicate a priori preferences
but that he is able to give preference information at a local level
concerning a particular solution. The progressive articulation takes
place through a DM analyst or DM machine dialogue at each iteration.
The DM is asked to give preference information regarding trade-offs be-
tween attainment levels of objectives based on the current solution, or
set of solutions, in order to advance to a new solution. As the solution
process progreses, the DM not only indicates his preferences, but also
18learns about the problem.
Methods for a posteriori articulation of preference information
determine a subset of the problem's nondominated solutions (those in
which no objective can be improved without a simultaneous detriment to
at least one other objective) . From this subset the DM chooses the most
satisfactory solution, making implicit trade-offs among objectives based
Figure 1
Taxonomy of MODM Methods Requiring
DM Preference Information
MODM Methods
A Prior: Progressive A Posteriori
Articulation Articulation Articulation
of Preference of Preference of Preference
Information
- Information
(Interactive
Information
Methods)
Cardinal Cardinal and
;
Information rdinal Information
Lexicogr aphic Goal Goal
Method Programming Attainment
Method
on some previously unindicated or nonquantifiable criterion or criteria.
The trade-off information, which remains implicit, is received from the
DM after the method has terminated and the subset of nondominated solu-
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tions has been generated.
For internal control system design and evaluation, methods classi-
fied as either interactive or a posteriori were rejected. For many
interactive methods there is no guarantee that the preferred solution
can be obtained within a finite number of interactive cycles, and much
more time and effort is required of the DM than is required with a
20
priori methods. A posteriori methods are severely limited in prac-
tical applicability because they usually generate a large number of non-
dominated solutions, making it very difficult for the DM to choose the
21
one which is most satisfactory. ~ For these reasons, and because it is
reasonable to believe that management can state a priori preferences con-
cerning their internal control objectives, an a priori method was chosen.
The method, goal programming, requires the DM to give the analyst
ordinal as well as cardinal preference information. The appropriateness
of ordinal preferences in MODM problems is well established. Easton
states that virtually every multiple objective decision problem involves
criteria of differing importance to the DM, and that "some objectives
22
must be given priority over others." Keeney and Raiffa found that
"almost everyone who has seriously thought about the objectives in a
complex problem [one involving multiple attributes and conflicts among
23
objectives] has come up with some sort of hierarchy of objectives."
In the area of interest, Fisher believes that "a firm must rank its con-
trol priorities in some systematic fashion as a preliminary step to any
detailed analysis of control," and that this ranking should be used as
a basis for cost/benefit analysis and selection of controls to be
24implemented.
Goal programming was chosen over the lexicographic and goal attain-
ment methods, the other a priori MODM methods which require both cardinal
and ordinal preference information. The lexicographic method is similar
to goal programming but is less flexible in that it does not allow the
25DM to specify goals. "" (Goals are specific levels of achievement
toward which to strive, whereas objectives are general "directions"
toward which to strive.) The goal attainment method is a variation of
goal programming which requires the DM to specify not only the desired
goals but also a vector of numerical weights relating the relative
under- or overattainment of the goals. When some goals are under- and
26
some overattained, deriving the vector of weights is very difficult.
Since both under- and overattainment of internal control goals is likely,
this method was also considered less appropriate than goal programming
for the research problem.
Goal Programming
The number of accounting and other applications of goal programming
is continually increasing. Charnes, Cooper and Ijiri applied the method
27
to breakeven budgeting. Killough and Souders modeled the manpower
28
resource allocation problem of CPA firms. Charnes, Colantoni, Cooper
and Kortanek discussed the application of goal programming to social plan-
29 30
ning. Other applications include advertising media planning, pro-
31 32 33duction planning, academic planning, medical care planning, multi-
34pie criteria evaluation of information systems and multiple objective
10
35
capital budgeting. " The use of the method in internal control system
design and evaluation represents a new application.
An analysis of the features of the goal programming methodology
both reveals its appropriateness for the present problem and provides
support for the contention that it is an appropriate and flexible method
for solving complex decision problems involving multiple conflicting
36
objectives. ' Goal programming was introduced by Charnes and Cooper
as a tool to resolve infeasible linear programming (LP) problems. LP
may be used to solve multiple objective problems by introducing objec-
tives other than the objective function as model constraints. However,
the optimal solution of an LP problem must satisfy all constraints.
Because goals set by management are often achievable only at the expense
of other goals, it is quite possible that all constraints cannot be
satisfied. If not, the LP problem is called "infeasible."
In goal programming, the objective is not to maximize or minimize
a single objective criterion directly but to minimize the positive and
negative deviations from goals based on the priority and/or relative
importance assigned to them. The DM must therefore establish a hierarchy
of importance among his conflicting goals so that lower-priority goals
are considered only after higher-priority goals are satisfied to the
extent possible or desirable. The model does not produce an optimal
solution (one which optimizes each objective simultaneously)-^ but
produces the "best" or "preferred" solution (the one which minimizes
deviations from the goals, given the DM's stated preferences). Both
an overall figure of merit and deviation values for each goal are pro-
duced.
11
One additional comparison between goal programming and LP highlights
the appropriateness of the former for internal control system design and
evaluation. To properly use LP, the DM must be able to quantify rela-
tionships among variables in terms of cardinal numbers. Unfortunately,
the DM may be unable to express an objective such as "minimize the loss
of goodwill due to the undetected occurrence of cause x" in terms of
dollars without a considerable degree of fabrication or distortion of
information. However, he will often be able to state upper or lower
limits (i.e., goals) for such objectives in terms of some other, more
39
appropriate unit of measure (e.g., probability). " An example goal
is "minimize the loss of goodwill due to the undetected occurrence of
cause x by installing controls with a combined effectiveness in con-
trolling cause x of at least .99." Goal programming allows the DM to
formulate such goals and then assign a priority to the attainment of
each of them. This ordinal solution feature is especially significant
in light of the incommensurable nature of internal control objectives.
General Goal Programming Model
The goal programming formulation employed in the present paper
40 41
is based on the approach taken by Charnes and Cooper and Lee. The
general formulation is:
+ + + — — -
Minimize Z=(P • y " D ) + (P " W * D )
Subject to
A • 3 + ID~ - n>
+
= G
3 10
where
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g is an (Mxl) vector of decision variables
A is an (NxM) matrix of technological coefficients
G is an (Nxl) vector of goals
) is an (Nxl) vector of i
tions from goal vector G
) is a (lxN) vector of pi
assigned to positive (negative) deviations
D (D positive (negative) devia-
P (P~) reemptive priority factors
W (W ) is an (NxN) diagonal matrix of weights reflecting
the relative Importance of positive (negative) devia-
tions within priority levels
M is the number of decision variables
N is the number of goals
I is the appropriate identity matrix
The goal programming solution procedure minimizes the objective function
by driving the values of the ranked and weighted deviations as close to
zero as possible through manipulation of the values of the decision
variables. The objective function is constructed in the following
manner.
First, each goal is analyzed to determine whether its over- or
under-attainment is acceptable. If over- (under-) attainment is accept-
able, the positive (negative) deviational variable can be omitted from
the objective function. For example, if the goal is to achieve a con-
tribution to fixed costs and profit of $10,000, a positive deviation is
acceptable and the positive deviational variable can be omitted.
Next, the positive and negative deviational variables to be included
in the objective function are grouped in ordered sets according to impor-
tance. Each variable in the j set is assigned a "preemptive priority
factor" P., which is interpreted via the relationship P.>>>P.. n to mean
3
v
J 3+1
13
that no number n, however large, can make nP ... greater than or equal
to P..
J
Finally, weights may be assigned to deviational variables having
the same preemptive priority factor. The criterion to be used is the
minimization of unsatisfactory achievement reflected in positive values
of deviational variables at each priority level. Because weighting fac-
tors represent relative amounts of unsatisfactory achievement, deviations
42from goals within a priority level must be commensurable.
III. Internal Accounting Control Model
Purpose and Components
The purpose of the internal accounting control model is (1) to
demonstrate the applicability of the general goal programming methodology
to the problem area and (2) to provide a base for exploring the potential
of the methodology for providing decision-making insights. The basic
components of the model are exposures, causes of exposures, controls and
processes, which are defined below.
An exposure is an adverse effect of some error or irregularity
(cause), stated in dollars. A control is a procedure or mechanism de-
signed to prevent or detect a cause. An exposure must be caused; it does
not arise simply due to lack of controls. The purpose of controls is to
43
reduce exposures by directly impacting their causes.
Consider the computation of an employee's gross pay by multiplying
hours worked by hourly wage. If the computation is made incorrectly
and this error (cause) is not detected, a loss of cash (exposure) equal
to the (assumed positive) difference between the computational result and
correct gross pay could result. To detect such an error, a redundant
14
processing control could be employed: two payroll clerks could make each
gross pay calculation and compare their results for equality. Although
this control is not foolproof, it would function properly a high percent-
age of the time, and detected errors could be corrected before they
caused exposures.
In the goal programing model, controls are evaluated in groups of
one or more called processes. Most real-world internal control situa-
44
tions are characterized by multiple controls for each cause of exposure.
The combined effectiveness of these controls—the probability that the
target cause will not occur or will be detected and corrected, given the
implementation of the entire group of controls—is the relevant measure
for system analysis. The use of processes enables the DM to reflect the
fact that the effectiveness of a group of controls is not always a
straightforward extension of the effectiveness of each individual control.
An important feature of this model is its ability to handle the
complex interrelationships between causes, exposures, processes and
controls. Table 1 characterizes a simple, but typical situation where
many types of these interrelationships exist. Exposure 1 may be caused
by cause 1 or cause 2; exposure 2 may be caused only be cause 1. To
prevent or detect cause 1, for example, process 1 (controls 1, 2, and 3)
or process 2 (controls 1, 2 and 4) may be implemented. (Alternative
processes to be considered are specified by the DM.) Also, each of
controls 1, 2, 3 and 4 is a component of two or more different processes.
In this example, then, the following types of interrelationships are
found: (1) one cause of more than one exposure, (2) alternative processes
for one cause, and (3) one control to prevent or detect more than one
cause.
15
Table 1
Interrelationships Among Model Components
Cause Exposure Process Control
1 2 3 4 5
1 1.2 1 y / /
2 y / /
2 1 3 y S /
4 y y y
16
Model Construction: Background
An internal control system modeled by the developed methodology
could reflect all three of these interrelationships. However, the model
presented in the present paper to illustrate the goal programming method-
ology will be based in the situation in Table 1 but will ignore exposure
2, and, therefore, will not illustrate type (1) above.
The constraints and goals to follow are applicable to both preven-
tive and detective controls. Preventive controls, such as the prenumber-
ing of checks and other forms, are designed to prevent causes of exposure
from occurring. These controls may involve one-time installation costs
and/or operating costs each time they are employed. Detective controls,
such as the redundant processing previously mentioned, are designed to
signal a cause of exposure after it has occurred. When one of these
controls signals the existence of a cause, that cause should be investi-
gated to determine what corrective action is necessary. Costs of detec-
tive controls include one-time installation costs and costs of searching
for errors and making whatever corrections are necessary when errors are
signaled.
The abstract situation to be modeled is as follows (see Table 2
for cost and effectiveness information). If no controls were implemented
for cause 1, the probability would be .30 that an expected exposure of
$300,000 would result during a specified period of time. The expected
exposure, therefore, would be $90,000. If process 1 were implemented,
the expected exposure would be $1,200 ($300,000 x .004). If process 2
were implemented, the expected exposure would be $3,000 ($3000,000 x
.010). If no controls were implemented for cause 2, the probability
17
Table 2
Cost and Effectiveness Information
Costs 1 - Effectiveness
Control 1 $ 5,000 _
Control 2 $20,000 ^
Control 3 $35,000 _
Control A $25,000 m
Control 5 $ 5,000 ,
Process 1 _ .004
Process 2 .010
Process 3 _ .008
Process 4 — .015
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would be .40 that an expected exposure of $1,000,000 would result during
the period, giving an expected exposure of $400,000. If process 3 were
implemented, the expected exposure would be $8,000 ($1,000,000 x .008).
Implementation of process 4 would yield an expected exposure of $15,000
($1,000,000 x .015).
Model Construction: Constraints and Objective Function
For the current model, the task of the goal programming procedure
is to determine which processes to implement, if any, given the follow-
ing assumed management objectives: (1) minimize the total of (a) out-
of-pocket costs of controls and (b) expected exposures during the period;
(2) implement at least one process for each cause; and (3) minimize the
probability of exposure from each cause. Zero-one decision variables
are used to indicate which processes and component controls should be
implemented. The model consists of several groups of constraints and
goals
.
The first group of constraints consists of one for each control.
These constraints insure that if any process x. containing control c.
is chosen for implementation (assigned a value of 1), the control will
also be chosen. The general form is:
(1) riCi - S x >_ Vi
where T = number of processes in model
er of processes containi
if process j contain control I
r. = numbe ng control i
1 otherwise
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C
i
=
1 if control i is chosen
i0 otherwise
1 if process j is chosen
J otherwise
The specific constraints for the example system are:
4c
l ~
x
l "
x
2 "
x
3 "
X
4 -
°
2c„ - x_- x_ >_
2c„ - x, - x„ - x, >_
2c
4 "
x
2 "
x
3 -
°
cc - x, >5 4 —
The second group of constraints consists of one for each process.
These constraints insure that if all controls in process x. are chosen
for implementation, that process is chosen (i.e., the system is "given
credit for" the process). The general form is:
(2) !«u"»ii-j-» «
where S = number of controls in the model
s. = number of controls in process j
c if control is is a component of process j
J
JO otherwise
The specific constraints for the example system are:
C
l
+ C
2
+ C
3 " *1 -
2
C
l
+ C
2
+ c
4 "
x
2 -
2
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(3)
I
sici
+ g \A\ + zg ^jiJjk - d+ = °
c, +c+c, - x.< 2
1 3 4 3 -
c. + c_ + c c - x. < 21 3 5 4 —
The first managerial objective for the current example, minimization
of the sum of control costs and expected exposures, is reflected in a
single goal. The goal contains non-decision variables V and Y which
are associated with expected exposures under different process implemen-
tation assumptions. The general form is:
S KE TKE
;
Jl
where K = number of causes in the model
E = number of exposures in the model
g. = cost of control 1 during the decision period
d, . = expected exposure 1 given cause k
b, = probability of cause k if no process is implemented to
control cause k
e # , = (1 - effectiveness) of process i in controlling cause kjk
jl if no control process is implemented to control cause k
\ =<
10 otherwise
if process j controls cause k and the probability of
of cause k occurring and not being detected and corrected,
Y., =1 given the model soluiton, is e.,
3 LO otherwise J
The specific goal for the example system is:
5,000^ + 20,000c
2
+ 35,000c
3
+ 25,000c
4
+ 5,000c
5
+ 300,000(.30)V
+ 1,000,000(.40)V
2
+ 300,000(.004)Y
1;L
+ 300,000(.010)Y
21
+
+ 1,000,000(.008)Y
32
+ 1,000,000(.015)Y - d^ =
21
The next group of constraints insure that, for each cause, (1) if
more than one process is implemented to control the cause, the total of
expected exposures due to the cause is the lowest total associated with
the implemented processes and (2) if no process is implemented to control
the cause, the total of uncontrolled expected exposures due to the cause
results. The general forms are:
(4)
j
Yjk + \ = 1 Vk
(5) Yjk - X < v j,k
The specific constraints for the example system are:
Y
ll
+ Y
21
+ V
l -
1
Yll- Xli°
y
21
- x
2
<
Y
32
+ Y
A2
+ V
2
= X
Y32- X3±-°
Y42" X4i°
The second managerial objective, implementation of at least one
process for each cause, is reflected in one goal for each cause. The
general form is:
T
- +
(6) Z X..+ d - d = 1 Vk
j
J
X. if process j controls cause k
where X., = <
J
JO otherwise
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The specific system goals are:
x, + x„ + d_ - d
2
= 1
x, + x. + <L - d_ 1
3 4 3 3
The third managerial objective, minimization of the probability of
exposure from each cause, is also reflected in one goal for each cause.
The general form is:
(7) I e. k
Y.
k
+ bkVk
- d
+
= Vk
The specific goals for the example system (after multiplying the
probabilities by 1,000 to convert them to integers) are:
4YU + 10Y21 + 300V1 - d* =
8Y
32
+ 15Y
42
+ 400V
2
- d* =
(Note: Goals for both objective one and objective three require con-
straints (4) and (5).)
The final group of constraints restrict the values of zero-one
variables. The constraints are:
(8) c
i
,x
j
,Vk
,Yjk = 0,1 Vi,j,k,l
The general form of the internal control model objective function is:
MLn Z = (P
+
• W
+
• D
+
) + (P~ • W" • D~)
If the preceding order of objectives is assumed to be management's
hierarchy, the objective function of the example system is the minimization
23
of the sum of five ranked and weighted deviational variables: d.. , the
positive deviation from the first objective goal; d„ and d„, negative
deviations from the second objective goals; and d, and d
5 ,
positive
deviations from the third objective goals. Positive deviations from the
second objective goals are acceptable, therefore d2 and d_ are omitted.
d„ is assigned a weight of 4 at priority level 2 because the expected
exposure from cause 2 ($400,000) is approximately 4 times that from cause
1 ($90,000) if no processes are chosen, d, and d_ are assigned weights
of 1 at priority level 3 because the probability of exposure from cause 1
(.30) is approximately equal to that from cause 2 (.40) if no processes
are chosen.
The objective function of the example system is therefore:
Min Z = P
1
d^ + P
2
d~ + P
2
4d^ + P
3
d£ + P
3
d^
Model Construction: Final Formulation
Grouping the objective function, goals and constraints of the pre-
ceding section results in the following general internal accounting
model:
Min Z = (P+ • W
+
• D
+
) + (P~ • W~ • D~)
S.T.
(1) r.c - 2 x _< Vi
j ]
(2) Zclj -xj <sj
-1 Vj
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S KE TKE
(3) JVi + »Wk + Eg ^jjjk - d =0
(4)
J
Yjk + \ 1 vk
(5) Yjk - x < Vj ,k
T
- +
(6) I x + d - d - 1 Vk
J
J
(7)
I
ejkYjk + bkVk " d+ - ° Vk
(8) Ci ,xjf Vk ,Yjk = 0,1 ^ Vi,j,k,l
Similarly, the specific exarple model is:
Mtn Z = V^ + P
2
d~ + P
2
4d^ + P
3
d^ + P
3
d^
S.T.
4c
l " *1 "
X
2 ~
X
3 "
X
4 -
°
2c
2
- Xl -x2 10
3c_ -x. - x~ - x , >_
2c
4
- x
2
- X3 >
c c - x- >5 4 —
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c. + c
2
+ c_ - x. <_ 2
c
x
+ c
2
+ c
4
- x
2
< 2
c, + c_ + c, - x_ < 2
1 3 4 3 —
c, + c, + c c - x. < 21 3 5 4 —
5,000c. + 20,000c
2
+ 35,000c
3
+ 25,000c
4
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Example Model Solution and Interpretation
For this model, the solution procedures produces the following ob-
jective function deviational variable values and non-zero zero-one vari-
able values:
C
l
= C
2
= C
3
= C
5
= 1
x
l
= x
4
= 1
Y
ll
:= Y42
= 1
<- 81,,200
d
~2
= d~3 =
<- 4
4- 15
The model solution specifies implementation of processes 1 and 4 at a
total control cost plus expected exposure of $81,200. This amount may
be verified by adding the costs of chosen controls 1, 2, 3 and 5 and
the expected exposures associated with Y. and Y,„ in the first goal.
The solution demonstrates that analysis of one cause at a time can
result in a less satisfactory control selection by the DM than does a
single analysis of interrelated causes (except in the special case in
which both analyses produce the same results). Focusing on cause 1,
the total of costs and expected exposure from implementation of process
1 alone is $61,200 ($5,000(c ) + $20,000(c ) + $35,000(c
3
) +
$l,200(exposure)). The total for process 2 alone is $53,000($5,000(c ) +
27
$20,000(c
2
) + $25, 000 (c) + $3, 000 (exposure) ) . However, choice of
process 1 results in a lower overall total because component control 3
is also a component of process 4, which is chosen. For similar reasons,
interrelated exposures should be analyzed together.
Sensitivity Analysis
An analysis of the effects of parameter changes after determining
the optimal (or, in the case of goal programming, the preferred) solution
is an important part of any mathematical modeling solution process.
This postoptimality study is known as sensitivity analysis. Because
there will usually exist some degree of uncertainty concerning real-
world internal accounting control model parameters—e.g., priority factors
goals and technological coefficients—sensitivity analysis is a vital
part of the goal programming methodology being developed. If, during
the analysis, the best solution to a particular model is found to be
relatively sensitive to changes in the values of certain parameters,
management should consider allocating additional organizational resources
to the collection and refinement of data pertaining to those parameters.
If the best solution is relatively insensitive to such changes, manage-
ment may wish to use those resources in some more promising endeavor.
Although sensitivity analysis is an important follow-up to the
initial solution of the model, there are no established procedures to
follow in conducting such an analysis on an integer goal programming
model. Even without the added complexity of a multidimensional objec-
tive function, sensitivity analysis in integer linear programming models
is far more complex than its counterpart in continuous models. The
dual solution does not have an equivalent meaning to the dual solution
28
in the continuous model, and the dual of the integer goal program has
yet to be developed. Due to the lack of systematic procedures, Jensen
recommends that the analyst rely on intuition and ingenuity in perform-
46ing sensitivity analysis on an integer programming model.
Current research is being conducted on the sensitivity analysis of
the developed internal accounting control model. It includes analysis
of the effects of changes in preemptive priority factors, goals and
technological coefficients (control costs, process effectiveness and
dollar values of exposures) . A further possibility is to add a budgetary
goal to the current set of management goals. The anticipated effects of
making such modifications are changes in (1) individual controls and
processes suggested for implementation, (2) total control costs and
expected exposures and (3) the probabilities of individual causes.
IV. Conclusion
To summarize, the purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate
the use of a systematic, comprehensive methodology in the design and
evaluation of internal accounting control systems in an environment of
multiple conflicting objectives and complex interrelationships among
exposures, causes of exposures and controls. It is anticipated that
use of the methodology would provide management with decision-making
insights that would be unavailable if control system components were
evaluated in a manner which ignored these interrelationships. Also,
system models would provide important documentation that a thorough
analysis of costs and benefits preceded the implementation of controls.
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